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 The International Comission Against Impunity in Guatemala –CICIG- (its Spanish 
acronym), helped Guatemala’s Attorney General’s Office investigate and indict Illegal 
Bodies and Clandestine Security Apparatus (CIACS) and other related crimes. In 2015, 
CICIG Commissioner Iván Velásquez, (2013-2019) with Attorney General Thelma Aldana 
and the Special Prosecutor´s Office Against Impunity headed by Francisco Sandoval 
discovered massive tax fraud on imported goods in the customs system. Called “The Line”, 
the criminal network involved businessmen and high-level officials including Otto Pérez 
Molina and Roxana Baldetti Elías, former President and Vice President.  
 One of Guatemala’s first major tax fraud and corruption cases, “The Line” exposed 
a justice system weakened by an underground network that bribed and initimidated judges, 
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and its government partners strengthened the rule of law and fought against corruption, illicit 
electoral financing and political interference. In 2015, they helped enact legal reforms to the 
judiciary and prosecutor’s office and presented constitutional, criminal, electoral financing, 
impeachment and amparo, habeas corpus and constitutionality law reforms still pending 
approval as of 2020.  
 During its legal reforms, emblematic cases of corruption and exposure powerful 
criminal networks deeply embedded in the state, the commission demonstrated that no one 
is outside the reach of justice, earning popular approval and building alliances with the 
attorney general’s office, civil society, national police and international cooperation who 
jointly took action in favor of continuing the fight against impunity and corruption. CICIG 
built a citizen trust and demonstrated that the powerful can be tried by helping the 
prosecutor's office pursue paradigmatic cases of drug traffickers, ex-military personnel, 




 In 2015, CICIG an international organization created to investigate corruption cases 
in Guatemala, revealed the system of corruption and tax fraud that allowed companies to 
avoid paying taxes in exchange for bribing customs authorities and collecting illegal funds 
to channel to corrupted actors integrated with high level officials, politicians, ex-President 
Pérez Molina and government staff. 
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The United Nations created CICIG in 2006 at the request of the Government of 
Guatemala 1  to help domestic institutions investigate and eradicate Illegal Bodies and 
Clandestine Security Apparatus (CIACS) and prevent their reappearance. These illegal 
bodies arose as counter-insurgents in the Guatemalan Civil War (1960-1996),2 which had 
roots in the country’s agrarian structure and economic exclusion, subordination of the 
indigenous, and authoritarianism. 3 These clandestine structures were replicated and 
maintained by encouraging organized violence to protect political and economic interests; 
using corruption, intimidation, coercion and others mechanisms of impunity.4  
After CICIG began operations in 2007, it focused on investigating and prosecuting 
crimes allegedly committed by the CIACS, strengthening Guatemalan institutions, 
proposing legal and institutional reforms, and publishing research. CICIG was not created 
to handle and solve cases, but to help dismantle the CIACS by determining their structures, 
operations, and finances. The Commission’s powers included investigate individuals or 
entities related to CIACS, requesting searches and subpoenas, presenting criminal charges 
to the Attorney General´s Office, acting as an adhesive plaintiff, and calling witnesses. 
(Under Guatemalan law, a party harmed by a crime can assist the prosecution with 
investigation, evidence collection, and other legal roles as an adhesive plaintiff.) 
CICIG was a hybrid international entity, unique in the world, that worked with 
Guatemala’s laws and institutions, but was internationally funded and neither financially nor 
                                                 
1 https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Citizen%20Security/2015/WOLA_CICIG_ENG_FNL_extra%20pa
ge.pdf p. 3 
2 Commission for Historical Clarification. Guatemala, memory of silence, Project Services Office of the United 
Nations (UNOPS). Sevigraficos, S.A. Guatemala, 1999. P.45-54 
3 Ibid. P. 82-94. 
4 Myrna Mack Foundation. International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala: Indispensable tool to 




functionally dependent on any Guatemalan institution. CICIG’s investigations showed how 
some private groups appropriated many state functions to enrich themselves, exploiting 
weaknesses in the Guatemalan justice system like low capacity and resources. 
In its early years, CICIG took a comprehensive approach to capacity building, 
working with the Attorney General´s Office to back up their investigation and indictment of 
crimes committed by the CIACS, supported by an agreement of bilateral cooperation5. 
Through the agreement, CICIG helped establish the Special Prosecutor´s Office Against 
Impunity (known by its Spanish acronym FECI) to investigate illegal groups activities and 
trained it in the adoption of investigative techniques and laws. 
The first CICIG Commissioner, Carlos Castresana Fernández (2008-2010),6 was a 
Spanish lawyer with experience in anti-corruption issues, who helped create the Commission 
together with members of civil society. He led CICIG’s institutional design and the 
integration of its investigative and legal teams and search for international support. During 
his term, the Guatemalan Congress passed legal reforms proposed by CICIG that 
strengthened the justice system and fight against organized crime. In June 2010, he resigned, 
blaming the “failure” of Guatemala’s commitment to combat impunity.7. 
His successor Francisco Dall’Anese Ruíz (2010-2013),8 a Costa Rican jurist and 
former attorney general, was criticized for alleged passivity in its investigations and for 
making strong accusations without concrete evidence against a group of judges and 
magistrates whom they accused of promoting impunity by benefiting organized crime 









groups. Nevertheless, under Dall’Anese, CICIG began investigations into the CIACS that 
guided the commission’s later work. 
Under both its first commissioners, CICIG promoted public policies and law reforms 
such as a law against organized crime, criminal procedure code, tighter gun controls, illicit 
trafficking of migrants, creation of centralized high-risk tribunals, domain extinction law, 
witness protection program and rules for court-ordered wiretaps9. These laws increased the 
transparency of the political system, provided legal instruments and improved justice sector 
performance, contributing to enhanced criminal prosecutions, judicial independence, and 
fairer sentences.  
 A new era began under Commissioner Iván Velásquez in 2015, when CICIG and 
Attorney General´s Office exposed a scheme of customs fraud orchestrated by ex- President 
Molina. The corruption network called “The Line”, whose members initially involved 
middle-level officials and individuals, reached a former president and vice-president. “The 
Line” transformed the personal and political position of President Otto Pérez Molina, who 
initially supported CICIG´s mandate until it dismantled his customs plot. The case enraged 
Guatemalans citizens, who began months of nonviolent protests that forced Pérez Molina to 
resign.  
 The prosecution and the commission thwarted 21 organized crime structures in 
201510 and more than 660 people linked to the processes in the executive, legislative, judicial 
and private sectors. Public opinion poll showed that citizens and civil society supported 
                                                 
9  WOLA Report on the CICIG Experience. 
https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Citizen%20Security/2015/WOLA_CICIG_ENG_FNL_extra%20pag
e.pdf p. 13 
10 Pérez, Zonia. El Periódico Post article: Miguel Ángel Gálvez, Judge who closed the circle against impunity. 




CICIG´s operations.11 The citizen’s protests were accompanied with some civil society 
leaders, in this case one of them was Manfredo Marroquín (Director of “Acción Ciudadana”, 
a national anticorruption nonprofit),12 who worked together with the global anti-corruption 
nonprofit Transparency International.  
 Popular indignation people toward the traditional political class contributed to 
Jimmy Morales´s winning election in 2015. Morales was a former television comedian who 
used the slogan "Neither corrupt nor thief" during his electoral campaign. 
In march 2015, before the end of CICIG´s third mandate, Commissioner Velásquez13, 
a Colombian jurist, human rights activist, former investigating magistrate on Colombia’s 
Supreme Court, whose experience was based on cases related to torture and abuse 
committed by anti-guerrilla force as well as illegal trafficking and corruption.14 Velásquez 
faced the absence of support from the president and congress for the new mandate extension 
and the deficiency of cooperation of government agencies in the investigation of cases 
(mostly the excessive use of judicial delays). 
Therefore, CICIG worked to eradicate impunity and corruption by strengthening 
Guatemalan justice system, developing strategies focused on supporting and contributing to 
the state´s institutions in the investigation and criminal indictment of crimes, and promoting 
the creation or reformation of institutional mechanisms and public policies necessary to 
eradicate illegal structures, in conclusion, was aiming to strength the judicial system and 
reduce impunity with investigation, prevention and education. 
                                                 
11 https://www.soy502.com/articulo/guatemaltecos-avalan-trabajo-cicig-segun-encuesta 
12 Founded in 1996 to help create a conscientious and committed citizenship with democratic development in 
Guatemala, also to promote transparency in public management. 
13 https://www.cicig.org/cicig/comisionado/ 
14 Civil organization equipped with structure or discipline of the military type. 
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CICIG´s work and the extension of its mandate became a controversial topic in three 
electoral cycles in 2011, 2015, and 2019. Candidates were divided: old-line politicians 
opposed CICIG´s work, while new politicians showed their support for mandate extensions 
for the popular commission. President Jimmy Morales originally expressed his support for 
CICIG15 and wrote “I wish to express my good will to request the extension of the CICIG's 
mandate from 2019 to 2021, a request that I will expressly ratify when the legally appropriate 
moment arrives” in the letter signed by Morales on April 15, 2016, addressed to the UN and 
published in the Diario de Centro América in September 2016.16  
But after his son and brother were linked to a corruption case occurred during the 
presidency of Otto Pérez Molina (2012-2015), his position changed radically. In 2017, 
CICIG asked for a preliminary judgment against Morales for illicit electoral financing 
carried out in 2015 during his political campaign.17 In an effort to avoid being connected 
with his predecessor’s corruption, Morales asked the UN for the removal of the CICIG 
commissioner. 18  The UN affirmed its support for the work carried out by CICIG´s 
Commissioner Velásquez. After this effort Morales persisted and proclaimed Commissioner 
Velásquez “persona non grata” and forcing him to leave the nation right away.19 Morales 
justified his decision by saying: "He abused his powers by making publications in the media 
                                                 
15  Gutiérrez, Karla. Diario de Centroamérica Post Article: President Jimmy Morales will request a new 
extension for CICIG. Guatemala, April 10, 2016. https://dca.gob.gt/noticias-guatemala-diario-centro-
america/presidente-jimmy-morales-solicitara-nueva-prorroga-para-la-cicig/ 
16 Vélix, Cristian. La Hora Post Article: Conflict of interests? When Morales offered to extend CICIG's 
mandate to 2021. August 19, 2019. https://lahora.gt/conflicto-de-intereses-cuando-morales-ofrecio-extender-
el-mandato-de-cicig-a-2021/ 
17 https://nomada.gt/pais/entender-la-politica/por-que-jimmy-quiere-expulsar-a-ivan-velasquez-del-pais/ 
18 Prensa Libre Post Article: Government complains to the UN about Velásquez and asks that Cicig limit 
himself to his mandate. https://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/politica/jimmy-morales-se-reune-con-el-




about accusations against Guatemalan citizens without observing the constitutional 
guarantee of the presumption of innocence … and due process"20. 
The attempted expulsion of Velásquez was frustrated by citizen and civil society 
support21 and filings in the Constitutional Court and with the Human Rights Ombudsman.22 
The Constitutional Court ruled in Velásquez’s favor, finding in a divided vote that Morales’s 
order violated the Constitution.23 
Delivery Challenges 
Corruption and Patronage:  
In Guatemala, public corruption was endemic at all levels,24 including a weak justice 
system25 and civil service patronage.26 On the 2015 Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index, Guatemala ranked 123rd out of 168 countries surveyed and scored 28/100, 
decreasing only 2 points by 2019.27  
Citizens who needed a service, a job, or a favor had to pay bribes. Corrupt practices 
produced a high social cost because they reduced opportunities and deprived people of 
                                                 
20 https://elsiglo.com.gt/2017/08/27/morales-declaro-non-grato-a-velasquez-porque-se-excedio-y-abuso-de-
sus-funciones/ 
21 Prensa Libre Post Article: President Jimmy Morales declares Iván Velásquez "non grato" and orders his 
expulsión. Guatemala, August 26, 2017. https://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/politica/jimmy-morales-
declara-non-grato-a-ivan-velasquez/.  




24 FLACSO. Impunity and corruption in the tax field. Acción Ciudadana. Guatemala. 2000. 
25 United Nations system in Guatemala. Office of the Resident Coordinator (OCR) Guatemala: Common 
Country Assessment. https://onu.org.gt/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Estudio-de-Situacion-
Guatemala.compressed.pdf p. 78 
26.National Human Development Report. UNDP. Guatemala: towards a Status for the human developing 
2009/2010. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/guatemala_indh_2009-10.pdf P. 76,86, 298. 
27 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 
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public services. Corrupt networks particularly excluded and exploited vulnerable groups like 
women, youth, people with disabilities, and the Indigenous.28 
Corruption and impunity were long entrenched in the political culture of Guatemala. 
When Velásquez recognized that he faced a corrupt network of ex-military, political, and 
business elites, he said in an interview that he had “never realized the corruption in 
Guatemala was of this size or level of state empowerment.”29 
Corrupt networks arguably turned the country into a “mafia state” with connections 
to the military and law enforcement as well as lucrative involvement in illegal schemes like 
money laundering, trafficking of narcotics and arms, car theft, kidnapping for ransom, 
adoption scams, and prohibited uses of protected lands.30 Francisco Sandoval, prosecutor of 
FECI, called these arrangements fundamental to The Line case, because it “summarized a 
work methodology that allowed establishing how CIACS operated, and how over time they 
restructured and later on became illicit political-economic networks.” 
An anonymous CICIG source said in an interview on Insight Crime that "The 
corruption system is so deep, with such deep roots, that it does not depend on any case or on 
any particular person". "It can change, adapt very quickly"31. 
Acts of corruption have survived, due to aspects such as outdated legislation, 
weaknesses in government institutions, justice and electoral systems, in which the common 
factor has been poor access to public information and lack citizen participation, which link 
                                                 
28 ICEFI/OXFAM. Corruption: Its ways and impact on society and an agenda to confront it in the North Central 
American Triangle. Guatemala. 2017.P. 235.  
29 García, Jacobo. El País Post Article: "I never thought that in Guatemala corruption was of this size or the 
level of state empowerment". San Salvador, December 16, 2018. 
https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/12/16/mexico/1544917421_544663.html 





conflicts of interest and impunity. Criminal Judge Juan José Lemus said that in Guatemala, 
high levels of corruption and impunity have occurred, in part, because of the frequent abuse 
of legal delays in criminal proceedings against elites. 
Impunity: 
 Impunity constitutes a violation of state obligations to protect the privileges and 
integrity of all citizens. It is a particular issue in Guatemala, where the intentional homicides 
rate accordingly to the World Bank was 29.4 per 100,000 people in 201532 and impunity 
rates estimated between 99.1 percent and 98.4 percent.33 The report by International Crisis 
Group explained that CICIG contributed to a steady reduction in Guatemala's homicide rate, 
which fell from 45.1 per 100,000 in 2009, the most violent year in the country's recent history, 
to 26.1 in 2017, and helped reduce the impunity rate for violent crimes from 98 percent in 
2008 to 87 percent in 2016.34 
In Guatemala the impunity has allowed the lack of confidence of citizenship in all 
democratic institutions of the country, where the weakness of security and justice institutions 
has left a state unable to respond because it is inoperative. According to Velásquez, there 
are only two possibilities to reduce impunity: “Either fewer crimes are committed or more 
convictions are handed down. In other words, greater action in prevention or repression, or 
a combination of both ”35.  
                                                 
32  World Bank Report of Intentional Homicides Rates. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?end=2017&locations=GT&start=1995 
33 Organization of American States. (OAS). Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala. Approved by the Inter-








Since colonial times, Guatemala’s traditional elite has dominated the powers of the 
state, with wealth from agriculture and businesses that exploited the majority Indigenous 
population. 36  This dominance has provoked several political and military challenges, 
including the Civil War that ended in 1996 and allowed both organized crime and emerging 
elites to accumulate influence over state institutions, electoral politics, and patronage.37 
 Impunity in Guatemala has undergone several transformations.38 Beginning in the 
1990s, reforms moved government control from the military to civilian governments and 
changed the criminal justice shifted from a postcolonial inquisitorial system, in which judges 
conducted investigations, to a more open adversarial system. From 2006 to 2016, many 
advances were made in the fight against impunity. However, the CICIG encountered many 
bottlenecks including delays and judicial interference.39 The Commission helped develop 
the Integrated Justice System (known by its Spanish acronym SIJ), a model to collect all the 
information related to the operation of justice institutions40. 
Another challenge faced was a poor criminal investigation addressed with the 
transfer of capabilities by CICIG to the relevant entities, such as the National Police, 
Attorney General Office, INACIF, among others. Obstacles like the malicious litigating, 
violence and harassment against justice operators 41 , the vulnerability of the judicial 
independence and the autonomy of prosecutors were tackled with law reforms proposed by 
the Commission and some approved by the Congress. 
                                                 
36 https://es.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/Guatemala_Elites_Crimen_Organizado.pdf p.7 
37 https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=5799f4984 p.4 
38 https://myrnamack.org.gt/images/redes_ilicitas/Layout_Impunidad_Redes_Ilicitas_MM.pdf p. 33-39 
39 Guatemala’s Lethal Legacy: Past Impunity and Renewed Human Rights Violations. Amnesty International. 
P. 11 
40 https://www.cicig.org/comunicados-2019-c/informe-dialogos-por-el-fortalecimiento-de-la-justicia/ 
41 http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/1184345829.pdf p.5 
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For the deficiencies in the judiciary budget42, poor academic training in the legal area, 
CICIG as essential key contacted various universities to start meetings and discussions on 
reform of university legal education43, a series of private conversations, in which public 
officials, academics, social leaders, as well as representatives of national and international 
organizations participated. 
CICIG, in order to combat impunity worked together with the Special Prosecutor´s 
Office Against Impunity (FECI) to investigate high-impact cases. 
Political Interference:  
In 2015, CICIG was in its third term concerned about a new extension of it, besides 
that was investigating high impact cases that involved some politicians and high level 
officials related to the central government. To build more investigations and combating 
corruption, CICIG needed to create and discuss more law reforms and secure the support of 
the President and the Congress. 
After  several investigations that implicated members of the executive,44 legislative45 
and judiciary system,46 were linked to the criminal phenomena such as judicial corruption, 
illicit electoral financing, contraband, drug trafficking, administrative corruption, and 
money laundering, being these reasons why they showed the lack of support47 for CICIG´s 













mandate extension and their commitment from government agencies for the investigation of 
cases.  
To address this delivery challenge, CICIG in collaboration with human rights 
ombudsman and civil society fought several times in the courts with judicial mechanisms 
for the durability of CICIG.  
The reason why the process had been delayed is that the CICIG investigated and sent 
to jail some politicians and relatives of the then President of Guatemala. These were motives 
for some deputies allied to the official48 and other parties49 and also, the Presidency50 
showed their dislike since to 2015 till 201951, rejecting the Commission´s work, its mandate 
and the importance of the counterparts like attorney general, the national police, human 
rights ombudsman and courts in the fighting against corruption, threatened the stability of 
this institution. 
Tracing the Implementation Process:  
 
Contributing to the reduction of impunity in Guatemala (2015-2018) 
 
After created an effective commission with prepared investigators, prosecutors, 
technologies, a careful capacity building with their own resources and strong authority, the 
Commission focused on developing and building solid political leadership and multilateral 
partnerships, judicial and legal reforms, joint efforts with national counterparts and civil 









society groups.52 CICIG also worked on research related to five priority areas53: political 
financing, judicial corruption, the narcotics trade, land dispossession, and the customs 
system. 
  The Commission took advantage from their battling corruption revealing more cases, 
working closely with the attorney general and civil society, strategically earning public 
support for their continuum work on the strength of the justice system and the country´s 
development, covering with another mandate extension more prosecution, prevention, 
policies and investigation and focused in its working plan. 
The CICIG, as a developing strategy joined the efforts made by social organizations 
and think-tanks in submitting law proposals related to justice system reform from 2015 to 
2018 and winning approval of certain laws by Congress. Examples of the legal reforms 
presented to the Congress and to the Security and Justice office of the Legislation and 
Constitutional Points Commission included: the judicial career law, the Attorney General´s 
Office law; the constitutional law; impeachment law and the amparo, habeas corpus and 
constitutionality law54. After their discussion, in 2016, the favorable opinion of the Congress 
Commission of Reforms to the Justice Sector was issued, approving the Attorney General´s 
Office law55, which promoted stability in the position of the Attorney General, development 
of the professional career of prosecutors, suppression of the advice of the Attorney General's 
Office and transformation of the disciplinary system; and the judicial career law56, to raise 
standards of judicial independence. 
                                                 
52 List of some civil societies that accompanied CICIG were: Fundación Mirna Mack, Alianza por la Reforma, 
Acción Ciudadana and Justicia Ya, as well as research centers like ASIES, ICEFI, Konrad Adenauer, 
53 https://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/2015/COM_085_20151113_VIII.pdf p.4,68. 
54 Ley de Amparo, Exhibición Personal y de Constitucionalidad. 
55 Decree 18-2016 of the Congress of the Republic, Reforms to the Attorney General´s Office Organic Law. 
56 Decree 32-2016, Judicial Career Law. 
15 
 
The Commission overcame political interference by discussing the benefits for the 
approval, obtaining the support from civil society and citizens in the lectures at the Congress 
about the importance of these reforms removing obstacles in the investigations, prosecutions 
and capacity building. 
In the case of other unapproved proposals, although there was a consensus with the 
executive, legislative and judicial system, and a national dialogue, these reforms did not get 
Congressional approval, they lost due to debates of the different political parties and various 
interest groups. 
CICIG´s Working Plan 2015-2018:  
Investigations and Prosecutions 
CICIG set two long-term objectives: contributing to the reduction of impunity in 
Guatemala and promoting Guatemala´s citizens’ participation in strengthening justice sector 
institutions. CICIG developed its activities in order to improve the capacity of the State in 
the investigation and criminal indictment of crimes committed by lawless structures linked 
to State entities, as well as, to seek a legal framework, institutional and citizen participation 
to eradicate and prevent reappearance of these mafia structures. 
To fulfill its objective, CICIG focused on criminal investigations, through a joint 
investigations teams of police and prosecutors to overcome their mutual mistrust and 
transfer knowledge to the security forces, particularly in operations aimed at dismantling 
large gang structures dedicated to extortion. 
16 
 
From 2015 to 2018, CICIG intervened in the process of prosecuting  56 cases57 in 
accordance with extortion, financing of political parties, judicial corruption, narcoactivity 
and dispossession of land and customs system, those corruption cases affected all levels of 
the public and private sectors, just as the three branches of the state. CICIG, contributed in 
the last years in complex corruption investigations that identified models and techniques 
routinely employed by this organized crime sector. 
CICIG's indictment work based on the strategic prosecution concept of emblematic 
cases that responded to the commission's mandate, having as objectives the dismantling of 
the CIACS, sanction of their participants and the protection human rights.  In the 
prosecutions CICIG participated, as technical support or adhesive complainant, together 
with FECI promoted the strategic analysis of the criminal phenomenon using special 
investigation methods, in which it conducted and delivered police, financial, criminal and 
forensics reports who supported and substantiated the criminal prosecution. This work was 
made possible by the contribution coordinated of national and foreign CICIG´s officials and 
the agreements celebrated with the attorney general office, the ministry of interior and 
official requirements to the superintendence of taxes and banks. 
The Commission pursued high impact cases which targeted the bureaucracy and the 
justice system and other cases who had the possibility of restoring the amounts stolen from 
the state.  Since 2015, CICIG fostered a culture of legality in Guatemalan society, presenting 
new corruption cases and arrests58 of CIACS members with extensive media coverage 
communication every Thursday, to such an extent that citizens already expected “CICIG 
                                                 





Thursdays,”59 the day of the week when the Commission normally announced through the 
media new investigations worked jointly with the Attorney General. These CICIG´s reports 
and law enforcement operations had opposition from businessmen, politicians and people 
involved in the criminal network, who tried to sink the anti-corruption efforts of the 
Commission, with black campaigns, demonstrations and opposition in Congress to pass 
certain laws, which CICIG overcame with strengthening its capacity building, the 
convictions obtained and the high expectations of citizens and the support of civil society. 
Capacity Building 
CICIG transferred operational capacity to justice sector counterparts by jointly 
developing activities related to research, advanced techniques, legal argumentation, legal 
and procedural principles such as objectivity and probity. The Attorney General´s Office 
and CICIG had technological systems for storage and correlation of information that were 
constantly updated and definitely served to investigate cases in 2015-2018. This was 
demonstrated with the collaboration that CICIG had with the financial, criminal, forensic 
and police reports in which it had the participation of national and foreign officials. 
The strengthening and transfer of capacities60 developed through training courses 
given by national consultants and international, as well as CICIG staff, in which topics 
related to the electoral criminal61 and administrative legal framework, methods and tools of 
research, organization and operation of teams of research, investigation and financial 
analysis, equally, the relationship between money laundering and illicit electoral financing.  
                                                 
59 https://www.prensalibre.com/tema/jueves-de-cicig/ 





Another method was the case studies used based on CICIG's experience and for the 
national police, the Commission had to create police units to support the investigation by 
the Attorney General, for the implementation of this strategic criminal prosecution 
methodology, they formed teams made up of prosecutors, police and specialized analysts 
for criminal phenomenon who, together with CICIG legal and police investigators, they in 
common developed research plans62. 
The police training was pedagogical in criminalistics and police investigation 
methodology, culminating the training with final suitability exams. Some of these trained 
police officers  distributed between the Attorney General Office and the CICIG to carry out 
investigative functions and police support, acquiring, with the accompaniment of 
international CICIG police investigators, to implement crime scene investigation skills, 
location techniques, surveillance and monitoring of people under investigation. 
Juan Francisco Sandoval, indicated that the guarantee of this transfer was based on 
the fact that if at any time the commission leaves, the capacity or work methodology can be 
transferred to teams of the Attorney General Office and the National Police. 
CICIG as a contribution to strengthening Judicial Branch´s capacities and Attorney 
General´s Office, built a National System of Measurement of Impunity63, adapted to the 
Guatemalan context, in order to serve for the construction of reliable official data and 
information generation models and as input for the elaboration of public policies by the 
national institutions. The purpose was to allow national institutions to assume responsibility 
for continuing the measurement of the impunity index in the country64. The data would be 
                                                 
62 https://www.cicig.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/InformeLegadoJusticia_SI.pdf p.48 





analyzed by process and outcome indicators related to the different criteria, dimensions and 
components of impunity according to the Ministry of the Interior, the National Institute of 
Forensic Sciences, and the Judicial Branch. 
To achieve the measurement, the following was performed: Analysis and 
compilation of the different concepts of impunity handled by the different international and 
national institutions, particularly the United Nations System (UNS), the justice system, the 
academy and civil society; A set of criteria on the models and ways of measuring impunity 
was required to achieve a definition in accordance with international standards 
(comparability), which in turn is appropriate to national reality (relevance); and analysis of 
indicators and established criteria for the measurement of impunity, data obtained on 
homicides, estimation of impunity for homicides in Guatemala in the period between 2005 
and 2014, thus testing the effectiveness of the model65. 
Until the first semester of 2018, institutional information was collected, approved 
and analyzed seeking to calculate the incidence, efficiency, effectiveness and impunity of 
the Justice System for all crimes registered as of 2008, with the goal of an analysis platform 
of a decade. 
This system showed for the 2008-2016 period, total impunity for all crimes was 
92.86%, with an annual total in 2008 of 96.40% and in 2016 was 90.87% (which implied a 
reduction of 5.53%). The trend of that account would be an average reduction of 0.7% per 
year. The annual effectiveness of the justice system has grown from 3.6% in 2008 to 9.8% 
in 2015 - also being the year with the lowest recorded impunity, with 90.2%.66. 






With the purpose of analytical and good practice in order to identify criminal 
structures and generate recommendations for reform, CICIG developed a manual of good 
practices in criminal investigations. The manual was dedicated to the anticipation of risks, 
threats or damages caused by the CIACS, the support of the officials of the Attorney General 
Office was essential for the development of this manual. 
 It contained practical and theoretical elements to apply in investigations against 
complex criminal structures. This manual stated that over time, criminal structures had 
opportunities to improve their mechanisms and processes. It is important to highlight that 
one of the findings of the report was the lack of capacity of the government to investigate the 
CIACS, having the opportunity to expand beyond Guatemalan territory and become a 
geopolitical problem that affects the entire region. 
Improving the Justice System 
In the second strategic line, the Commission worked to diagnose obstacles in the 
national justice system, proposed legal and institutional recommendations, and researched 
and draft thematic reports. Legal advisor David Gaitán said the reports were necessary to 
fulfil Millennium Goals, commitments the CICIG had made with UN agencies in Guatemala. 
These reports were focused on sex trafficking for sexual exploitation, the link between 
violence against women and organized crime, and political finance. 
The commission also worked to reform the Postulation Commissions, constitutional 
bodies that prepare lists of candidates approved for appointment to high positions of the State 
by the President or Congress.67 Political interference in the commissions has been evidenced 
                                                 
67 Political Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala, articles: 207, 214, 215, 216; Postulation Commissions 





by election process anomalies. For example, former Vice President Roxana Baldetti and the 
ex-deputy Gudy Rivera tried to pressure Claudia Escobar, former magistrate of the Appeals 
Chamber of the Supreme Court to issue a favorable sentence to benefit Roxana Baldetti's 
official party, in exchange for reelecting her in the period 2015-2019.68 
In 2017, the Commission worked with a network of justice organizations to develop 
amendments to the postulation commissions law, to guarantee the transparency of the process 
and adequate qualification and evaluation of applicants.  In sum, CICIG strengthened the 
Rule of Law and the justice system through direct and joint work with its main counterpart, 
the attorney general and transferred capabilities through investigation and criminal 
prosecution, essentially it worked as a team with the national authorities with the objective 
of fulfilling their mandate in the fight against impunity and corruption. 
Proposals for legal reform promoted by CICIG (2015-2018)  
Since its implementation, CICIG was clear that the legal reforms were key to the 
development of its objectives and strategies, CICIG’s investigations revealed evidence of 
the operations and illicit actions of the CIACS, leading to urgent reforms in criminal 
investigation law procedures.  The Commission formed a specialized team that carried out 
an extensive review of the criminal law and criminal procedural regulatory framework and 
existing research methods, with the aim of contributing to the modernization of the tools 
available to the criminal justice system to confront the criminal activity of the CIACS.  
CICIG's legal reform team translated the result of this review into a matrix in which 
the existing problems were established, and designed a concrete line of work, always related 
to the objectives of the Commission with its counterparts.  From 2008 to 2010 CICIG 





worked on 21 legal reform proposals, of which 13 were approved, reforms that were 
necessary to guarantee the proper functioning of the Guatemalan system, investigation and 
judicial prosecution. The Commission also promoted the establishment of high-risk crime 
courts especially for people involved in serious related to the prioritized criminal phenomena. 
However, it was necessary to promote other reforms focused on eliminate different 
mechanisms of impunity, from elements organic-functional to substantive and procedural 
aspects of the Guatemalan legal regime.  These reforms prepared in consultation with 
representatives of government institutions and the United Nations, in order to put the 
Guatemalan legal system in conformity with international conventions on human rights. 
Since 2015 to 2018, CICIG worked with the Attorney General just like national and 
international organizations to promote and present to the congress 10 legal reforms, of which 
two were approved.69 The first strengthened the independence and effectiveness of the 
Attorney General’s Office, including objective criteria for prosecutorial appointment and 
removal. The second promoted judicial independence and disciplinary procedures. The 
unapproved proposals related to prosecutors, the police, forensic investigations, the prison 
system, law education and election of authorities in state institutions. 
CICIG worked on removing obstacles to the investigation and criminal prosecution, 
and proposed law reforms of Constitutional Amparo Action, the regulation of the 
impeachment, the Criminal Procedure Code, and aspects on preventive detention.   The 
design of the reforms based on the criminal prosecution of the abuse of power to purge the 
State of the illicit political-economic networks, same as the implementation of public 
                                                 
69 (Attorney General´s Office Law, Legislative Decree No. 18-2016 and Judicial Career Law, Legislative 
Decree No. 17-2017).  https://www.cicig.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Informe_ReformasLegales.pdf 
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policies, legal reforms and institutional strengthening measures to eradicate the impunity 
and consolidate the democratic rule of law. 
 The Commission overcame political interference and corruption when it built legal 
reform proposals, finding at the time a fairly open Congress regarding many of the proposals 
that were strategic and conditional for any achievement that the Commission may have in 
the future regarding their cases, also had the fundamental and permanent support of civil 
society, as a leading actor in the reforms, present in some of the law discussions made by 
Congress this was a form of public pressure in the approval of legal reforms. 
The relationship between organized civil society and CICIG continued its 
strengthening and consolidation. An institutional policy of openness to civil society 
permitted analyzing their situations short-term national scenario, knew problems from 
different points of view and established cooperative relationships in different work areas of 
the Commission. The cooperation allowed the discussion and proposal of legislative reforms, 
social discussion of anti-corruption issues and verification processes for the selection of 
justice system authorities. CICIG also held numerous productive meetings with foreign 
officials and diplomats.70 
CICIG addressed impunity through general monitoring of the administration system 
of justice, because in Guatemala impunity for crimes functioned very efficiently, and 
certainly the investigations carried out by CICIG advanced to such an extent that they 
affected the traditional powers in the country, specially the economic, military, and political 
                                                 
70 Government representatives: Germany, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Spain, United States 
of America, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, México, Norway, Netherlands, Perú, Great Britain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Europe Union, Uruguay.  
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elites.  The work of CICIG and the prosecution had a lot of support from citizens and civil 
society, who trusted that a rule of law could be strengthened through these institutions. 
After 12 years of work, as part of its mandate, CICIG provided support to the 
Attorney General Office in the investigation and prosecution of several high impact cases, 
the Commission on its way to fight corruption also worked in its relations with national 
counterparts to achieve its objectives. CICIG imposed strong internal policies, concerned 
about counterparts could undermine their cases, because the results of investigations against 
high level government officials, for the same reason, they built an integrity working relation 
to aim their anticorruption guidelines with various counterparts. 
The renewal of CICIG’s mandate generated controversy between the ex-President 
Pérez Molina and civil society, which specified the decision of request the Secretary General 
of the United Nations Organization, a new mandate´s extension. The U.S. government 
resolved this controversy by linking economic aid to Guatemala to the extension of the 
CICIG's mandate. 
The Attorney General´s Office support was fundamental for the development of the 
impunity measurement system, thematic reports and manual of good practices in criminal 
investigation, strengthening trust between district attorney's, assistants and CICIG 
investigators. The collaboration that existed between CICIG and Attorney General was 
essential for its work and embodied in the UN agreement. At the beginning of its 
establishment the relationship was poor because the lack of support of the previous Attorney 
General71, this lack of cooperation could possibly have been due to its relationship with the 
corrupt structures under investigation. 
                                                 
71 Juan Luis Florido (2004-2008). 
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As the highest authority of the National Police, the Ministry of Interior had to give 
support to specialized prosecutors and specialized police, with educated professional agents. 
This was largely achieved by the bilateral cooperation agreement between both institutions, 
although this institution participated in corruption cases, which were investigated and 
prosecuted.72 
 Facing Political Obstacles in 2018-2019 
CICIG found another problems in its fifth and final extension of the mandate, when 
in September 2018, again the presidential prohibition remained to Commissioner Ivan's 
Velásquez to entry in Guatemala, despite a contrary decision of the Constitutional Court; in 
addition, another obstacle was the lack of renewal or repeal of courtesy visas of several 
CICIG international investigators, followed by the revocation of their accreditations and the 
setting of a period of 72 hours for leave the country in December 2018. 
Morales' annoyance escalated after CICIG in 2017, decided to investigate him and 
his family members for embezzlement, fraud and campaign finance violations. The then 
former president could not be prosecuted because the Congress refused to lift the Immunity 
of President Morales in September 2017. Thus, Morales persisted in removing CICIG and 
succeeded. 
These events produced the arrest of a CICIG investigator by Guatemalan border 
authorities in January 2019, which prompted Velásquez to work remotely from the 
neighboring country of El Salvador. The Commission continued to work and held face-to-
face and online meetings with a group of investigators73, including the head of the Special 
Prosecutor's Office against Impunity to continue analyzing corruption cases. 





These meetings were short and although most used videoconferences.  In the absence 
and personal treatment of the Commissioner for a year, the meetings were also organized 
with deputies, with non-governmental human rights organizations, with the Alliance for 
Reforms (a consortium of more than 30 anti-corruption entities), 74  with indigenous 
authorities, and journalists. 
They faced challenges with the coordination at the higher level of the Attorney 
General Office, the direct counterpart was the Special Prosecutor's Office against Impunity, 
with that agency it continued to accompany investigations, presentation of cases and 
hearings. The Commission prepared a transition process that included the withdrawal as an 
adhesive plaintiff of legal proceedings which it was supporting. Nonetheless, the technical 
support in the litigating continued until the end of the mandate. CICIG’s mandate ended on 
September 3, 2019.75 
Outcomes 
The indictment cases efficiency and criminal prosecution indicators are figures for 
sentences obtained over the years, which have obviously been increasing, by point that 
between 2018 and 2019, 43% of defendants were convicted.76  
Verifying the quantity and impact of cases from 2008 to July 18, 2019, more than 
1,540 people have been implicated in cases brought by CICIG and Attorney General. Under 
Velázquez, a greater number of investigations and judicial proceedings  carried out, with 
771 defendants and 41 sentences given by the judiciary from 2015 to 2018.77 The joint 










investigations led to more than 660 people processed by 2019. 78  During the period                         
2017-2018, were issued 71 sentences, and from the period 2018-2019, there were another 
139 sentences of which approximately 90% were conviction sentences.79  
Of the more than 120 criminal cases accompanied by CICIG, more than 100 were 
handled by FECI, where a variety of criminal issues were addressed (extrajudicial 
executions, torture, murder, money laundering, corruption in the justice sector, customs 
fraud, etc.) and more than 400 conviction sentences were issued. 
The reforms implemented against crime and violence in the justice system, left 
positive results, specifically in the area of legislative reform and anti-corruption laws, which 
tightened penalties for crimes, also brought as a legacy, the Law Against Organized Crime, 
which modernized the criminal system, since it allowed the application of the figure of 
effective collaborator, in addition to introducing the model of undercover agents and 
wiretapping. 
Now that the commissioner`s term ended, a Gallup survey revealed80 that CICIG was 
one of Guatemala´s most trusted and popular international institution, because they showed 
that it was possible to fight against impunity and corruption and strength the rule of law.  
However CICIG worked in its relationship improving it and its result was a good 
practice that served as a model for other countries, an example being is when the first 
mission belonging to the Organization of American States81, started operations in 2016, in 
                                                 







the Honduran Republic in order to support corruption and impunity from a comprehensive 
perspective.  
Lessons Learned: 
Cooperation with domestic institutions helped CICIG tackle corruption 
The performance effectiveness of these entities in the judicial hearings - the Attorney 
General's Office as accuser and represented by FECI staff, and CICIG as an adhesive 
complainant through their litigating lawyers, was strategic and showed there is hope to 
eradicate impunity and corruption with a strong partnership with local agencies, civil 
societies and technical international cooperation was a key factor of success.  
This was possible due to the agreements signed between national institutions, the 
support given by civil societies to the work of CICIG and the financial aid from international 
cooperation in order to fight impunity and corruption. 
The strong support of both institutions based on the cases investigated and the 
sentences obtained, coherence and joint work, were fundamental advantages to tackle 
corruption cases and strength justice in Guatemala. 
Successful prosecutions: Case selection 
After the “Line Case”, Velásquez changed the focus of the CICIG, moving away 
from the collection of cases he inherited and focusing on a set of investigations on the 
sources of corruption politics in government, rural city halls, and links between the 
embezzlement of state resources, illegal financing of political campaigns and crime 
organized in a context characterized by weak judicial and security systems. 
The CICIG based the selectivity of cases to support Guatemalan partners to confront 
the phenomenon of the CIACS, which through crimes affect the rights of Guatemalans and 
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who has the capacity to seek impunity. To specifically pursue certain cases involving co-
optation of the State by criminal structures, they had all the institutional support possible 
within the previous attorney general82 that supported them and judicial branch to guarantee 
impunity. 
 Escalating political attacks and electoral cycles 
The attacks suffered by the Commission since 2016 have also shown that efforts to 
strengthen justice are not enough to transform the state. CICIG came to unveil the brain of 
the CIACS and stripped the capture of the various corrupted sectors, government and 
political institutions. 
Very powerful sectors saw the fall of the mechanisms and mafias controlled by them 
through the State and decided to hinder the Commission´s work and stop the institutional 
reform and strengthening processes with political interference and many times taking 
advantage of electoral cycles. Some of the tried to discredit and erase the legacy of the 
Commission. 
To generate greater changes in Guatemala and fight impunity, the justice sector can 
serve as a catalyst and trigger for processes of change. It is essential to leverage that process 
with comprehensive reforms to the State. The political class, civil society, the media must 
promote necessary reforms to strengthen democracy. 
  
                                                 
82 Former prosecutor Juan Luis Florido, accused of collaborating by diverting an investigation related to a 
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